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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the work of bar association ethics committees.
These are committees established by bar associations to give advice to
lawyers about how to comply with the applicable rules of professional
conduct.' My question is, are these committees broken? Over the past
two decades, several legal academics have concluded that they are.2 At
its harshest, the critique is that ethics committees, typified by the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis Stein Center for
Law and Ethics.
1. See, e.g., Leah F. Chanin, The Scope and Use of State Ethics Opinions, 14 J. LEGAL PROF.
161, 161 (1989).
2. For contemporary commentary on the work of ethics committees, see generally CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.6 (1986); Jorge L. Carro, The Ethics Opinions of the
Bar: A Valuable Contribution or an Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L. REV. 1 (1992); Chanin, supra
note 1; Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in
Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981); William H. Fortune, The Role of Ethics
and Unauthorized Practice Opinions in Regulating the Practice of Law in Kentucky, 25 N. Ky. L.
REV. 309 (1998); Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to Make State Legal Ethics Opinions, 22
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 973 (1997) [hereinafter Hellman, A Better Way]; Lawrence K. Hellman,
When "Ethics Rules" Don't Mean What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics
Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317 (1996) [hereinafter Hellman, Strained ABA Ethics
Opinions]; Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389 (1992);
Richard H. Underwood, Confessions of an Ethics Chairman, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 125 (1991);
Whitney A. McCaslin, Note, Empowering Ethics Committees, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959 (1996);
Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers'
Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with Author). Not all of
this commentary is critical, but much of it is, to varying degrees. For an earlier discussion of the
work of ethics committees, see OLAVI MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 2-13
(1970).
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American Bar Association's ("ABA") ethics committee,3 publish
opinions that respond to trivial questions by providing poorly reasoned
answers on which nobody can or does rely, and that the reason that the
committees' opinions are inadequate is that the committees themselves
are poorly designed.4
I take a more positive view, which is colored by my own
experience. I have been a member of the New York State Bar
Association's ethics committee since 1992, and recently completed a
three-year term as chair. I also spent three years as a member of the
ethics committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
These experiences, of course, make me less than objective about the
work of the committees. Nonetheless, they enable me to offer an
insider's perspective.
I will start with some background-first, a short discussion of how
lawyers resolve questions about the proper course of their professional
conduct, and then, a short discussion of the help provided by ethics
committees, using the New York State bar's committee as an example.
Next, I will summarize the problems that legal scholars have identified
in the past. Finally, I will try to put the committees' work in a more
positive light and offer some reflections in response to the committees'
critics. I will not argue that ethics committees are perfect and have no
room to improve. But I will suggest that they have been greatly
undervalued by their critics and that they are not inherently flawed.
II. BACKGROUND: How LAWYERS RESOLVE QUESTIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
A. Sources of Interpretive Guidance
Like everyone, lawyers are subject to laws and regulations.5 For
lawyers, these include the rules of professional conduct adopted by state
courts. In New York, for example, lawyers must comply with
disciplinary rules contained in the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility.6 New York lawyers who violate these disciplinary rules
3. Most bar association ethics committees have specific titles, such as the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. However, for ease of
reference, this Article will use the more generic "ethics committee" to refer to all such committees.
4. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 65-66.
5. See Carro, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that "[b]oth legislatures and courts, from without,
and the legal profession, from within, have adopted regulations governing the practice of law");
Hellman, Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, supra note 2, at 140-41.
6. See N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(1)-(2) (2001).
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are subject to professional sanction, including the possibility of
disbarment.7
Sometimes, lawyers are uncertain how to proceed in light of the
rules that govern their conduct. For example, in recent years, many New
York lawyers have sought the New York State Bar Association's help.
Some were grappling with fundamental questions about their
professional role and responsibilities. A municipal lawyer asked whether
he could give helpful advice to someone who was suing the town
without the benefit of counsel, or whether doing so would violate the
lawyer's duty to represent the town zealously.8 A lawyer employed by a
union sought the committee's help in determining what duties he owed
to union members. 9 A lawyer hired by an insurance company to defend
its policyholder asked whether he could take direction from the
insurance company and provide it with information about his work in the
lawsuit, or whether doing so would violate his duties to the defendant.'0
A lawyer for an older client who was no longer able to manage her own
personal and financial affairs wanted to know whether he could ask the
court to appoint a guardian, even if the client did not consent."
How do lawyers such as these decide how to conduct their practices
in the context of professional obligations and expectations? Most of the
time, lawyers try to solve their ethical dilemmas on their own. This is
one sense in which the legal profession is partly, although not entirely,
self-regulating: Lawyers have a personal responsibility to act in
conformity with professional norms; being trained in the law, lawyers
are presumably capable of figuring out what is expected of them, at least
most of the time.' 2
Often, a lawyer's question is not clearly answered simply by
reading the code. The disciplinary rules are not written with absolute
precision and specificity. Some express very general principles. For
instance, lawyers may not "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice."'3 Other rules set forth a general framework for
analyzing a question of professional conduct, as is true of the conflict-of-
7. See WOLFRAA, supra note 2, § 3.5.1, at 117-18.
8. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 728 (2000).
9. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 743 (2001).
10. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 721 (1999).
11. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 746 (2001).
12. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILIrY pmbl. (2001).
13. Id. DR 1-102(A)(5). Likewise, lawyers may not engage "in any other conduct that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer." Id DR 1-102(A)(7).
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interest rules. 4 To understand how imprecise provisions apply in
individual cases, lawyers need to read them against the background of
other sources of learning about what is, and is not, permissible.
When it is not clear what the rules mean or how they apply to a
specific situation, lawyers have various sources of written guidance. The
preferable source is case law. Judicial decisions interpreting the rules
serve as the only definitive guide to their meaning. 5 But, many questions
are never reached by judicial decisions. Courts may interpret disciplinary
rules in essentially two procedural contexts, but each provides only a
limited number of opportunities to shed light on lawyers' professional
obligations.
First, courts oversee the disciplinary process.16 Typically, the initial
determination of whether a lawyer violated a disciplinary rule is made
by a referee or panel, and that decision is then subject to judicial
review.'" In the context of making decisions about whether lawyers have
transgressed and, if so, what sanction to impose, courts are occasionally
required to interpret an ambiguous disciplinary rule. However, only
rarely is this the case. Most disciplinary cases involve criminal conduct
or alleged conduct that, if it occurred, is unquestionably wrongful, such
as mishandling client funds. Disciplinary authorities rarely prosecute
lawyers who make tough calls in situations where the disciplinary rules
are uncertain; indeed, most close questions of interpretation never come
to the disciplinary authorities' attention."
Second, courts address questions concerning attorneys' conduct
when these questions are presented in litigation.' 9 For example, one party
may seek to disqualify the opposing party's lawyer, claiming that the
lawyer has an impermissible conflict of interest. Alternatively, a party
14. For instance, a lawyer must decline a representation that "would be likely to involve the
lawyer in representing differing interests" unless "a disinterested lawyer would believe that the
lawyer can competently represent the interest of each [client] .... Id. DR 5-105(A)-(C).
15. See, e.g., RoY SIMON, SIMON'S NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
ANNOTATED xiii (2002 ed.) (recognizing that bar association ethics committees' opinions are not
binding on courts or disciplinary agencies).
16. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.2.2, at 24 ("American courts ... have asserted the
affirmative power to regulate the legal profession."); Carro, supra note 2, at 13; Bruce A. Green,
Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should
the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 462-63 (1996) [hereinafter Green, Whose
Rules of Professional Conduct?].
17. See Carro, supra note 2, at 13.
18. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that "only a portion of all potential
disciplinary cases will be initiated at, stay in the hands of, or even come to the attention of, the
office of bar (disciplinary) counsel").
19. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM
L. REv. 71, 71 (1996) [hereinafter Green, Conflicts of Interest].
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may move to suppress evidence that the opposing party's lawyer
allegedly obtained by improper means. The types of professional
conduct that courts customarily address are limited in rangeY Moreover,
courts often can avoid resolving a question of professional conduct or
can resolve it without interpreting the disciplinary rules. If courts can
avoid interpreting a rule, they typically do so, because most courts do
not consider it an important part of their function to give lawyers advice
about the meaning and application of disciplinary rules. Of the four
questions described earlier, none is definitively answered by the case
law.
Lawyers seeking to answer questions of professional conduct on
their own may also turn to secondary sources. Treatises and articles
often contain their individual authors' views about what the disciplinary
rules mean and how they apply to particular situations. For example, a
New York lawyer may turn to Simon's New York Code of Professional
Responsibility Annotated,2' which not only collects existing New York
authorities, but also includes Professor Simon's personal commentary on
the disciplinary rules.2 Other secondary sources reflect lawyers'
collective views. Recently, the American Law Institute ("ALL")
completed the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, a
decade-long project that reflects its members' views about what the law
governing lawyers is and, in areas of uncertainty, should be.23 The ABA
and some specialized bar associations have developed standards of
recommended conduct for lawyers engaged in specific types of
practice.24 A lawyer is more likely to find a specific question clearly
answered somewhere in the writings of individual authors than in the
Restatement, which is a collection of black-letter rules and therefore
tends to be as general and ambiguous as the disciplinar codes, but the
individual writings tend to be less authoritative, because they do not
necessarily reflect a professional consensus on how the rules apply.
Where do lawyers go for help when they do not have time to
undertake the research necessary to resolve for themselves a tough
question about the proper course of professional conduct or when, even
20. See, e.g., Carro, supra note 2, at 16; Underwood, supra note 2, at 129.
21. SIMON, supra note 15.
22. Likewise, New York lawyers may seek guidance in a collection combining ethics
opinions issued by New York bar associations and accompanying commentary. See THE NEW YORK
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: OPINIONS, COMMENTARY & CASELANV (Mary C. Daly
ed., 2001).
23. See RESTATEMENT (TInRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (1998) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
24. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, chs. 3-4 (2d ed. 1986).
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after referring to judicial decisions and secondary literature, they remain
in doubt? Typically, they consult another lawyer, who can bring his
experience and judgment, as well as greater objectivity, to bear in
assisting the lawyer who has a professional dilemma. Lawyers who work
in a law firm or other type of law office can often draw on the assistance
of an "in-house ethics expert"--a lawyer in the office who has
developed special expertise in dealing with issues of professional
conduct.' Some lawyers can obtain advice from their malpractice
insurer.26 Lawyers may seek assistance from mentors or professional
acquaintances. Or they may retain a practitioner or law professor who
concentrates in the area of professional responsibility.
B. Bar Association Ethics Committees as Another Source of Guidance
There is another significant source of guidance, and it is the one
that is the focus of this Article: bar association ethics committees.2
Many bar associations appoint committees for the purpose of giving
advice to lawyers who have questions about the propriety of their
professional conduct. The ABA's ethics committee is the most
nationally prominent one.29 In New York State, there are several.
Indeed, New York State has the distinction not only of being home to
the oldest bar association in the United States-the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York-but also of being home to the first bar
association to authorize a committee to give advice to lawyers about
their professional conduct-the New York County Lawyers'
Association, which did so in 1912 .
25. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure
in Large Law Firms: A Callfor Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 691,706-07 (2002).
26. Most notably, the Attorney Liability Assurance Society, Inc. ("ALAS") answers questions
from lawyers at the law firms it insures about how to avoid the risk of civil liability and professional
sanction. See ALAS, About ALAS, at http://www.alas.com/about/shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
27. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 15, at iii; Monroe Freedman, Misguided Acclaim for a
Misplaced Advocate, RECORDER, Sept. 8, 1992, at 10 (stating in the byline that Professor Freedman
often testifies as an expert witness on lawyers' ethics).
28. As noted later, in some states the same function is served by a committee appointed by the
state supreme court, rather than the bar association. See Chanin, supra note 1, at 161; infra notes
65-67 and accompanying text.
29. The ABA's ethics committee is the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility. See ABA, Legal Ethics, at http://www.abanet.org/scripts/PrintView.asp (last visited
Feb. 22,2002).
30. See SIMON, supra note 15, at xiv-xv (listing the names and addresses of five of the most
active professional ethics committees of New York bar associations).
31. See Chanin, supra note 1, at 162.
[Vol. 30:731
BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS COMMITEES
Ethics committees around the country are organized and operated in
different ways, but, in general, they have a single function-to give
advice to lawyers-which they do in either or both of the following two
ways. First, they give advice directly and privately to individual lawyers
who ask specific questions about how the disciplinary rules apply to
their proposed conduct?2 Committees typically receive questions in
writing and provide a letter in reply. Some also field questions over the
telephone, including, in some cases, via an "ethics hotline."33 Either a
member of the committee or a member of the bar association's staff
provides guidance, to the extent possible.
Second, ethics committees publish opinions on questions that they
believe to be of general significance to lawyers. 4 The ethics opinions are
not authoritative in the way that judicial decisions are.35 But they provide
guidance to lawyers who are seeking to resolve questions of professional
conduct on their own.36 The ethics opinions take their place alongside
law review articles, treatises, the Restatement, and other secondary
sources of learning about the meaning and application of disciplinary
rules.
Consider, for example, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
New York State Bar Association. It is not necessarily representative, but
it is the committee that I know best.37 The committee has approximately
twenty-five members from around the state. Although several of us are
law professors, the overwhelming majority are practitioners who work in
different practice settings and engage in different types of practice. The
committee draws on the services of two bar association staff members in
Albany who field inquiries from lawyers around the state.
The state bar association receives over 1500 inquiries a year. Most
do not involve challenging new questions that implicate vague or
ambiguous code provisions, but rather, can be answered by referring to
clear provisions of the code or to prior opinions of the committee or of
32. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 66; Chanin, supra note 1, at 163.
33. The State Bar of California has in place an "ethics hotline" that provides "a telephone
research service to assist attorneys with questions relating to their ethical responsibilities." The State
Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility and Conduct, Ethics Opinions Index, at
http:lvwv.calbar.org12pub/3eth/3ethndx.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
34. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 15, at xiii (stating that ethics committees issue "formal or
informal written opinions to address complex or important questions").
35. See, e.g., id. (asserting that bar association ethics committee opinions are not binding on
courts or grievance committees, but that a lawyer's compliance with an ethics opinion decreases the
likelihood of discipline).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. The information herein was confirmed by telephone interview. See Telephone Interview
by Matthew Minerva with Kathy Baxter, Counsel, New York State Bar Association (Feb. 25, 2002).
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another bar association committee in the state. Some questions are more
difficult. When they require a rapid response, they are referred to a
member of the committee's "telephone subcommittee," who attempts to
help the inquirer resolve the question.
If the inquiring attorney has a difficult question that need not be
answered in a hurry, or if he is not satisfied with the initial response
given by the bar association's staff member or by the subcommittee
member with whom he spoke, he is invited to submit his inquiry to the
committee in writing-whether by mail, e-mail or fax. The inquiry is
then forwarded to the committee, which handles approximately sixty
written inquiries a year. Each inquiry goes initially to a committee
member to conduct research and draft a letter in response. Committee
members may draw on the assistance of law student researchers who are
supervised by a law professor on the committee. In recent years, Hofstra
law students, overseen by Professor Simon, have served in that role.
The full committee meets monthly to review the draft letters
prepared by committee members. In many, if not most, cases, the draft is
approved the first time it is presented, subject to revisions or
amendments that the drafter and committee chair are authorized to make.
But this is not always the case. Sometimes, the committee raises
questions that the original drafter had not fully considered. These
questions may require additional research, or require a committee
member to elipit additional facts from the lawyer who posed the
question. Occasionally, a majority of the committee members is
dissatisfied with the drafter's analysis or conclusion. The committee will
ask the drafter to expand, revise, or completely rewrite the draft. When
questions are particularly difficult, the process can extend over several
meetings. Once a response is approved, it is included in a letter sent to
the inquiring attorney by the chair of the committee. The letters are not
public.
If a particular question is thought to be of general interest, it
becomes a candidate for a formal, or published, opinion. The committee
member will be asked to prepare a draft based on the private letter sent
to the original inquirer. Because there is no longer a particular lawyer
who is waiting for an answer, the committee can spend more time
debating and conducting research.. It can reframe the question in more
general terms, both to avoid identifying the lawyer who sent the inquiry,
and to make the advice more broadly applicable. On occasion, the
committee also prepares sua sponte opinions-that is, opinions that do
not respond to a real lawyer's inquiry to the committee but that are
developed at the committee's initiative. The questions addressed in these
[Vol. 30:731
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opinions have come from various sources, including from questions
asked at continuing legal education programs at which committee
members participated.
Sometimes, in the course of the process of preparing and discussing
a proposed formal opinion, what initially seemed to be a clearly correct
conclusion no longer seems so clear or so correct. Sometimes, it is so
difficult to forge a consensus that the committee decides not to publish
an opinion on the subject. Most of the time, however, after a number of
revisions and sufficient discussion, a substantial majority approves the
opinion. The committee, unlike the ABA's counterpart, has a strong, but
not absolute, tradition against issuing dissenting opinions."
Once approved by the committee, the formal opinion is published
by the bar association. Between July 2000 and July 2001, the committee
published seventeen opinions." The opinions are available on the state
bar association's website as well as on the electronic services, LEXIS
and Westlaw.40 They are summarized in Professor Simon's treatise as
well as in the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,
which contains synopses of ethics opinions issued by bar associations
nationwide.4 ' Among the recent opinions of the New York State Bar
Association Committee are opinions addressing the four questions
identified earlier.42
I1. ARE THE ETHICS COMMITTEES BROKEN? SOME PRIOR ACADEMIC
PERSPECTIVES
This brings me to the question that is the subject of this Article: Are
the bar association ethics committees broken? Over the past twenty
years, several legal academics have considered this question. One
commentator, Richard Underwood, defended the committees' work from
his perspective as chair of the Kentucky Bar Association committee, but
38. The last opinion with a dissent was Opinion 651, published in 1993. See generally N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 651 (1993) (discussing legal referral services).
39. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 746 (2001); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 730 (2000).
40. The opinions are available online in the following databases: Westlaw, in database
"NYETH"; LEXIS, in the database "NY State Bar Assoc Comm on Prof Ethics/State Ethics Comm-
Decs"; New York State Bar Association, http://www.nysba.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2002), under the
heading "Ethics."
41. See SIMON, supra note 15, at xv, 1361-1412 (compiling New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics opinions issued since November 2000).
42. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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his defense has stood virtually alone.43 Most commentators have
concluded that the ethics committees are dysfunctional.44 They have
identified three principal problems. Each problem is attributed to a
different flaw in the design of the ethics committees and leads to
different proposed solutions.
A. Do Ethics Committee Opinions Deal with Trivial Subjects?
The first major criticism is that the opinions published by ethics
committees deal with trivial subjects. This charge was leveled by
Cornell law professor Charles Wolfram in his treatise, Modem Legal
Ethics, published in 1986.'  In a section on bar association ethics
committees and their opinions, he suggested that ethics opinions are
rarely cited in academic scholarship or in judicial decisions, and that
they do not play a large role in disciplinary decisions or in judicial
46rulings on such matters as disqualification. He attributed the
insignificance of ethics opinions, in large part, to self-imposed
jurisdictional limitations which, in his view, made it inevitable that bar
committees will ignore the questions of greatest significance to the bar. 7
First, the committees typically answered only questions about the
inquiring lawyer's own future conduct, not questions about the lawyer's
past conduct or about the conduct of another lawyer.48 This meant, he
believed, that lawyers would raise only the kind of questions about
themselves that might safely be described on their own letterhead.49
Second, ethics committees typically interpreted only the applicable
disciplinary rules, and not other law that might separately bear on the
propriety of the lawyer's conduct or that might be intertwined with the
question about the disciplinary rules.50 The obvious solution to these
problems would be for the ethics committees to answer a broader range
of questions.
43. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 140 (asserting that "ethics committees provide important
services" in the reality of today's world).
44. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 66; Finman & Schneyer, supra note 2,
at 140.
45. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 66-67.
46. See id. at 67.
47. See id. at 66-67.
48. See id. at 66.
49. See id. at 66-67.
50. See id. at 67.
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B. Are Ethics Committee Opinions of Poor Quality?
The second major criticism is that the ethics committees' opinions
are of poor quality. This was the conclusion of Ted Finman and Ted
Schneyer, who published the first serious scholarly inquiry into the work
of bar association ethics committees in 198 1.5' They focused on the work
of the ethics committee they considered the most important-the ABA
committee, which has been issuing opinions since 1924.52 Examining
twenty-one formal opinions published by the ABA from 1970 to 1979,
they considered whether the committee correctly interpreted the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility and, on occasions when different
results might reasonably be reached, whether it provided an adequate
explanation.53 They concluded that the opinions were "seriously
flawed."'54 Fully a third of the opinions, in their view, were clearly
decided the wrong way.5 Even those that were not clearly wrong, but
merely debatable, often overlooked relevant authority, failed to identify
alternative arguments, lacked adequate analysis, or were seriously
ambiguous.56
For Professors Finman and Schneyer, the source of the problem
was that the ABA committee's procedures were not adversarial.57 The
committee received an analysis from a single committee member, and
did not receive alternative analyses of the problems it considered.
Finman and Schneyer proposed that the committee appoint advocates to
argue opposite sides of each question before deciding it.5 9 This, in their
view, would be better than an alternative procedural change; conducting
hearings or adopting a notice-and-comment process, like that employed
by administrative agencies, in order to obtain input from interested
members of the barf °
51. See inman & Schneyer, supra note 2, at 70-72.
52. Seeid. at71.
53. See id. at 72, 92.
54. Id. at 72.
55. See id. at 101.
56. See id. at 114. Writing a few years later, Professor Wolfram was similarly critical of the
ABA opinions. Many, he noted, were "very dogmatic in their answers, without recognizing apparent
areas of doubt or ambiguity"; often, they relied on "strong statement rather than flawless
reasoning"; "[t]he strength of the committee's convictions [was] not always matched by [the]
strength of [its] analysis." WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 66.
57. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 2, at 145, 156-63.
58. See id. at 160.
59. See id. at 163.
60. See i at 166.
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C. Ethics Committee Opinions Are Ignored
The third major criticism of bar association ethics committees is
that their opinions can be, and are, ignored, either by courts, by
disciplinary agencies, by lawyers, or by some combination of the three.
Much of the literature on ethics committees is devoted to the question of
whether courts follow them, which seems to be the litmus test for many
commentators. On this question, there has been some disagreement.
Some have concluded that courts care about ethics opinions, based on a
tally of cases citing them. 6' However, Professor Wolfram and, in a more
recent writing, Lawrence Hellman, took the view that courts do not care
about what ethics committees have to say.62 Professor Helman also
expressed concern that disciplinary agencies ignore the work of ethics
committees.63
Professor Hellman's diagnosis was that the problem with bar
association ethics committees is that they are not part of the legal
regulatory process. 4 He proposed that his own state, Oklahoma, follow
the lead of New Jersey, where advice is not given to lawyers by bar
associations but by an advisory committee on professional ethics whose
members are appointed by the state supreme court.6' Opinions issued by
the committee may be reviewed by the state supreme court, whose
decisions are binding on lawyers, disciplinary agencies and lower
courts. 66 Unreviewed advisory opinions, although not binding on New
Jersey courts, are treated deferentially. 67 In Professor Hellman's view:
"A system that generates a steady stream of published ethics opinions
that carry some real authority would contribute to greater visibility of the
rules, enhance general discourse about legal ethics, and promote better
understanding about and compliance with the professional
responsibilities of lawyers. 68
61. See, e.g., Carro, supra note 2, at 33 (concluding, as the result of quantitative and
qualitative analysis of a study based on a computerized search of federal and state court decisions
citing ethics opinions, that "ethics opinions are an important component of the ethics laws to the
courts"); see also id. at 15-33.
62. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 67; Hellman, A Better Way, supra note 2, at
987-89.
63. See Hellman, A Better Way, supra note 2, at 988.
64. See id. at 1000.
65. See id. at 1000-01.
66. See id. at 1002-03.
67. See id. at 1004.
68. Id. at 999-1000. In a forthcoming article, Peter Joy makes a similar proposal to replace bar
association ethics committees. He proposes, first, that responsibility for giving advice be shifted to
professionally-staffed disciplinary agencies under the auspices of the state supreme courts; that state
supreme courts review published ethics opinions when requested to do so; and that state supreme
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To sum up, over the past two decades, several academic
commentators have examined bar association ethics committees and
concluded that they are not working well. They have tended to focus
their attention on the most visible product of the ethics committees-
namely, the opinions they publish-and particularly the ABA opinions.
Judging the ethics committees by their published opinions, critics have
concluded that the committees are not serving a very important role,
since their opinions address insignificant questions and give wrong or
poorly reasoned answers, on which a lawyer cannot safely rely because
disciplinary agencies and courts do not take them seriously. The ethics
committees are defective in ways that require either changing how they
conduct their work or replacing them altogether.
I have a different view of bar association ethics committees. I do
not propose to fully answer the earlier critiques. However, I do propose
to paint a more positive picture of the ethics committees and their work,
beginning with an appreciation of the place of ethics committees in the
legal ethics process, and concluding with reflections in response to some
of the principal criticisms.
IV. A DEFENSE OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS COMMITTEES:
WHAT ROLE Do ETHICS COMMITrEES PLAY IN THE
LEGAL ETHICS PROCESS?
Whether you think bar association ethics committees function well
or poorly depends, for starters, on what you think their function is. If
you were evaluating a vehicle, it would not be a fair criticism to say that
it could not float or that it could not fly if it were a car rather than a boat
or plane, because it's function in the transportation process would be to
move over land. Likewise, it would be unfair to criticize bar association
ethics committees for failing to accomplish objectives that are not their
own.
A. The Objectives of Ethics Committees
Let us begin with two roles bar association ethics committees do
not play. First, they are not rule makers. That is a role assigned to the
courts.69 Bar associations contribute, but not primarily through the ethics
courts make opinions published by disciplinary agencies binding in disciplinary proceedings. See
generally Joy, supra note 2.
69. See Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct?, supra note 16, at 462-63.
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committees. Most bar associations have separate committees that draft
and review proposed disciplinary rules.
Second, bar association ethics committees are not disciplinary
agencies. That is a role played by disciplinary or grievance committees
under judicial oversight.0 It is true that ethics opinions may influence
the disciplinary process. In New York, for example, disciplinary
authorities sometimes ask an ethics committee's advice about the
meaning and application of a disciplinary rule. More often, individual
lawyers seek a committee's advice with the expectation that, if they
follow that advice, disciplinary agencies will not prosecute them.7' That
expectation is a realistic one.72 Nevertheless, it is not the primary
purpose of ethics committees to influence decision-making by
disciplinary agencies.
What is their primary purpose? It is simply to give guidance to
well-intentioned lawyers who are uncertain about how to practice in the
context of the disciplinary rules.73 It is, therefore, a mistake to compare
ethics committees to courts, rulemaking bodies, or disciplinary agencies,
each of which exercises legal authority. A fairer comparison is to in-
house ethics experts and privately retained outside ethics experts.74 It is
70. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Discipline, A Guide to Attorney Disciplinary
Procedures in New York State, at http:llwww.nysba.orglpublic/grievance.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2002) [hereinafter New York Disciplinary Procedures Guide].
71. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 15, at xiii.
72. See Joy, supra note 2, manuscript at 336.
73. Cf Underwood, supra note 2, at 142 (opining that "ethics committees should serve only
[one] purpose-to provide limited (disciplinary) protection of lawyers who come to the committee
in good faith"). In my judgment, well-intentioned lawyers should act in conformity with the
disciplinary rules regardless of whether failing to do so puts them at risk. Providing protection to
lawyers who rely on ethics opinions should be at most an incidental function of ethics committees.
74. It is useful to place the ethics committees' role in historical context. Before the ABA
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, in most jurisdictions there was no attempt to
codify professional norms. Professional expectations were transmitted informally-passed down
from senior lawyer to junior lawyer as part of an oral tradition. For the most part, they were also
enforced informally: when a lawyer in the professional community violated conventional
expectations, other lawyers might take the lawyer aside to explain that law was not practiced in that
way; if the lawyer continued to transgress, he would be ostracized. That remains one way in which
professional norms continue to be transmitted and enforced, especially in small, homogenous
professional communities. But, by the early twentieth century, with the rise of cities and the influx
of immigrant populations, regulation by word of mouth was no longer enough.
The ABA and other bar associations sought to fill the void by making professional self-
regulation formal. But, at least initially, their role was extralegal; they were not an arm of the state.
For example, the Canons of Professional Ethics, which the ABA adopted in 1908, were not initially
meant to be enforceable law, but were simply meant to give guidance to lawyers. Bar associations
established ethics committees to serve a similar extralegal function by addressing questions that
were not clearly answered by the Canons. The early ethics opinions were ordinarily based on the
Canons, sometimes loosely, but they did not "interpret" the Canons in the way that a court might
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true that, as Professor Joy's forthcoming article describes, the bar
associations' role expanded throughout the early and mid-twentieth
century, because courts gave them disciplinary authority and permitted
them to employ the canons a8 enforceable law for lawyers.75 But, as the
ABA itself has recognized, regulation of the legal profession is primarily
the responsibility of the state courts.76 Over the past several decades,
state courts have assumed this responsibility, and properly relegated bar
associations to a supporting role.7 Ethics committees help fill regulatory
gaps, but they do not exercise legal authority.
The role served by ethics committees as legal advisor to lawyers
with professional dilemmas complements the role of individual experts.
A comparison suggests that each have their own advantages.
Individual experts are preferable for certain types of questions.
Ethics committees have to deal with facts at a more abstract level than
an individual ethics advisor. No ethics committee can review many
pages of documents to ascertain the facts or resolve questions that are
extremely fact-intensive, where much turns on factual nuances. In such
situations, they will typically give the inquirer a general framework and
leave it to the inquirer to reach an ultimate resolution. Ethics committees
cannot give written advice as quickly as an individual. When a question
is especially difficult, ethics committees may take a long time to give an
answer, precisely because the answer will be the product of ongoing,
collective deliberation. Seeking advice from an individual lawyer,
especially one in the same law firm, limits the extent to which
embarrassing or highly confidential information is disseminated. Finally,
the jurisdictional restrictions on the ethics committees' work limit the
kind of questions that ethics committees will answer and how fully they
will answer.7s All of this means that an ethics committee cannot
eliminate the need for an individual expert in every situation.79
interpret a statute. If a lawyer asked a question on which the Canons were silent, an ethics
committee could give guidance based on broad principals underlying the Canons or on conventional
professional understandings that were not codified. In other words, the Canons were not initially
"law" and ethics committees were not attempting to do the courts' job of definitively interpreting
the "law." See generally WVOLFRiAI, supra note 2, §§ 2.6.2-2.6.6 (discussing the historical context
of legal ethics from the early canons to ethics opinions and committees).
75. See Joy, supra note 2, manuscript at 326-27.
76. See ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT: LAWYER
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 1, 2 (1992).
77. See, e.g., New York Disciplinary Procedures Guide, supra note 70.
78. Sometimes, court rules, or other laws aside from disciplinary rules, bear on the propriety
of a lawyer's conduct, or the disciplinary rules themselves refer the lawyer to other laws. Ethics
committees will not interpret the other laws to which the disciplinary rules refer. Sometimes, a
question cannot be fully resolved without assessing a lawyer's past conduct or the past conduct of
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At the same time, with regard to the category of questions that they
can answer, bar association ethics committees have two principal
advantages over in-house or outside experts or other individual lawyers.
First, they give advice for free. Many lawyers, particularly those who do
not work in large law firms, do not have access to the free services of an
individual lawyer who is especially knowledgeable about the
disciplinary rules and the case law and legal literature discussing them.
Second, ethics committees give opinions that are likely to carry greater
weight with a disciplinary agency because they will generally have
greater legitimacy than opinions from a retained expert or an in-house
ethics advisor who renders advice privately, and often orally, based on
his personal reflection and individual perspective. This is true for several
reasons. Ethics committees are generally more objective, especially as
compared to an in-house ethics advisor, who may be naturally
predisposed to give the answer the other lawyer in the firm seeks. Ethics
committees make decisions collectively, can draw on their members'
collective experiences and perspectives, and can deliberate aloud, all of
which is likely to lead to sounder conclusions. Because of the diversity
of their membership, they can compensate for individual biases and
idiosyncrasies. And when questions are tough, they can publish the
results of their deliberations, legitimating their views by putting them to
the test of public scrutiny and criticism.
V. How SHOULD ONE MEASURE THE VALUE OF ETHIcs
COMMITTEES?
Let me turn, now, to some of the specific criticisms directed at bar
association ethics committees. It is not surprising that commentators
tend to focus on the work of the ABA ethics committee, gauge the
quality of its opinions, and measure their impact. The ABA is, of course,
the largest and most nationally representative bar association and its
ethics committee's primary contribution is the publication of opinions.'
In one sense, its committee's pronouncements about the meaning of the
another lawyer, as is true of questions involving a lawyer's duty to report another lawyer's
misconduct. Ethics committees will generally not answer or opine on past conduct. See supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisdictional limits of bar association ethics
committees).
79. Cf Underwood, supra note 2, at 177 (noting "that there is still room for the paid ethics
consultant to operate.... [in the context of] disqualification motions, malpractice suits, and
disciplinary and fee cases"). Professor Underwood appears to imply that, in giving guidance
concerning a lawyer's future conduct, ethics committees are invariably preferable to paid ethics
consultants.
80. See, e.g., Finman & Schneyer, supra note 2, at 71.
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disciplinary rules would seem to be the most important ones. After all,
the ABA has played the leading role in codifying professional standards
and promoting them nationwide.8' The ABA's work product does not, in
itself, govern lawyers!' But courts, in determining what disciplinary
rules to adopt, have been greatly influenced, directly and indirectly, by
the ABA Model Rules.83 This being so, it would seem to be important to
ask what the ABA thinks its Model Rules mean.
In measuring the contribution made by ethics committees, however,
it is a mistake to focus on the ABA and exclusively on published
opinions. Most state and local bar associations provide a service that the
ABA committee does not provide: They attempt to assist every lawyer
who has a question about how to interpret or apply the jurisdiction's
disciplinary rules to his or her own future conduct.' Most of the
committees' time is likely to be taken up providing private advice to
individual lawyers, and that may be the more significant service these
committees provide. For many, this consumes much more time than
publishing opinions. To focus exclusively on the ABA and its published
opinions is to miss the extraordinary service that ethics committees other
than that of the ABA provide to state and local lawyers by answering
their questions privately by telephone or in writing. Many times, the
questions are intensely fact-specific and would be uninteresting to other
lawyers. However, the questions are important to the lawyers who
ask them.
Even if one focuses on published opinions, it is a mistake to view
the ABA committee as typical. It is, in fact, unique, in that it limits its
role to giving advice about model rules.85 In contrast, state and local bar
associations give advice about rules that are not simply models, but that
serve as the law for lawyers in the state.86 They do something that the
ABA cannot do: They interpret real rules in the legal and practical
context in which they are applied. Disciplinary rules do not exist in the
abstract or in isolation from other law. They are part and parcel of a
body of state law and opinions. They must be interpreted in light of
binding decisions issued by the state courts and against the background
81. See McCaslin, supra note 2, at 966-67.
82. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 2, at 83-84; McCaslin, supra note 2, at 966.
83. See Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct?, supra note 16, at 462-63.
84. Although the ABA has lawyers within its Center for Professional Responsibility who are
available to assist lawyers with questions of professional conduct, the ethics committee itself picks
and chooses what interpretive questions it answers, and concentrates its efforts on answering
questions that it believes to be broadly significant. See, e.g., McCaslin, supra note 2, at 973-74.
85. See ABA CONST. art. 31, § 31.7.
86. See, e.g., McCaslin, supra note 2, at 978.
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of all the state law and court decisions. State disciplinary rules also exist
in the context of state law practice and all of what might be termed "the
lore of the profession"-the traditions and history of state law practice,
received wisdom, and understandings passed down over time. A state or
local committee can take account of the professional lore as well as the
law. The ABA committee could not have answered the same questions
in this way. It might say what model rules mean in the context of its idea
of the average state law and the average state law practice, but it could
not consider enforceable law in the context in which that law is applied,
interpreted and enforced. This being so, for a lawyer or a court in any
particular jurisdiction, it would make more sense to seek guidance in the
opinions of the ethics committees of that jurisdiction than in the ABA
opinions.
Whether one focuses on ABA opinions, state and local bar
association ethics opinions, or both, it is a mistake to measure their value
by the extent to which courts rely on them. When courts ignore ethics
opinions, that does not necessarily mean that the courts believe that
ethics committees have nothing to offer to one's understanding of the
disciplinary rules. Often, a court ignores ethics opinions because it is not
interested in the meaning of disciplinary rules. Disqualification decisions
in the Second Circuit provide an obvious illustration. The courts of this
circuit have made it clear that they will not invariably disqualify a
lawyer when the lawyer has a conflict of interest that would be
impermissible under the applicable disciplinary rules. Even though the
lawyer might be subject to sanction, the court may permit the lawyer to
continue the representation if, as a practical matter, no one will be
harmed by the conflict of interest. 9 The courts have developed their own
jurisprudence on the question of when disqualification is necessary.90
Since they are not relying on disciplinary rules, they have no reason to
look at ethics opinions interpreting disciplinary rules.
87. Thus, when it answered the questions identified at the outset, see supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text, the New York State ethics committee could examine the particular lawyer's
dilemma in the context of relevant state law and procedure. The municipal lawyer's question about
how to deal with an unrepresented claimant on the other side of a lawsuit was examined in the
context of the state law and procedure governing claims against a municipality, while the question
of the attorney for an incapacitated client was examined in the context of both the state law
governing durable powers of attorney and the state law governing legal guardianships.
88. See Green, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 19, at 74-75 (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin,
625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d
Cir. 1979); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976)).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 72.
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Moreover, influencing courts should not be a major aim of ethics
committees. When a question comes before the court, it will have the
benefit of briefing and argument on opposite sides of the question as
well as a chance to conduct its own research and to draw on its own
experience." Sometimes a bar association will file a brief as "friend of
the court," because it seeks to influence as well as assist the court? In
most cases, however, bar associations do not weigh in on the meaning of
disciplinary rules in question. They either assume that the court can get
things right without the bar association's help or conclude that they do
not have a strong interest in which way the court interprets the particular
rule. Courts do not need the help of the ethics committees nearly as
much as lawyers do.
The ethics committees' major contribution is to provide guidance to
well-intentioned lawyers. This includes, particularly through hotlines
and unpublished letters, giving advice on questions that can be easily
resolved by referring to the rules and the case law.93 This also includes
giving advice on the many questions of interpretation that the rules
present and that courts have not answered. As noted, difficult questions
of interpretation rarely come to the courts by way of the disciplinary
process."' Courts field questions in litigation, but many of those
questions focus on the problems of litigators. And, courts address only a
narrow class of litigators' conduct-typically, conduct about which the
opposing party has an incentive to complain. This leaves out conduct
about which the lawyer's own client might complain. The largest
proportion of court decisions on questions of legal ethics involve
litigators' conflicts of interest.95 With respect to the questions that courts
do not address, the largest body of writings is produced by bar
association ethics committees.
Ethics committees also consciously influence the development of
the law, not primarily by influencing court decisions, but by two other
means. First, they influence how the legal profession understands the
disciplinary rules in the interstices-that is, in the broad areas that courts
never address. Some ethics opinions capture how lawyers already
understand the rules, but others contribute toward the development of a
91. See Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct?, supra note 16, at 488.
92. See id. at 498.
93. See McCaslin, supra note 2, at 967.
94. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 129-31 (describing the limited role the judiciary plays in
the disciplinary process).
95. See Green, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 19, at 71.
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consensus of opinion among lawyers within the jurisdiction concerning
how the rules should be applied.
Second, ethics committees influence the development of the
disciplinary rules themselves. In the course of giving advice and
publishing opinions, ethics committees identify ambiguities in the
disciplinary rules that ought to be clarified through later amendments.
They identify candidates for new rules by unearthing problems as to
which the disciplinary rules are essentially silent.6 And, they identify
rules that should be amended because they do not seem to make sense as
applied.97
Finally, ethics committees contribute to an ongoing dialogue within
the profession about how lawyers should behave.98 Since many of their
opinions deal with aspects of professional conduct that are not the
subject of judicial decisions, they bring otherwise hidden problems to
light. Although ethics committees typically weigh in on one side of the
question, their opinions are not the last word, precisely because they are
not binding on courts." They encourage discussion of professional
dilemmas that might otherwise be ignored.
Given the various contributions that ethics committees may make,
at least one thing should be clear. Their success should not be measured
by tallying the number of judicial decisions that cite their published
opinions.
VI. ARE THE ETHICS COMMITTEES CONFINED TO ADDRESSING
TRIVIAL QUESTIONS?
Among the universe of questions about lawyers' professional
conduct, courts provide a definitive answer to a small number. Of the
many questions unanswered by courts, some are unlikely to come before
ethics committees, in part, for reasons already identified, including that
96. For example, misdelivered documents, the subject of the new Model Rule 4.4(b), was an
earlier subject of ethics opinions. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility,
Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
97. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 747 (2001); Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'1 and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1991-1 (1992).
98. This function is served by other vehicles as well. For example, reports issued by bar
association committees, such as the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, contribute to the professional dialogue about how lawyers should
conduct themselves. Conferences on professional ethics, such as those conducted at Hofstra
University School of Law, Fordham University School of Law, and other law schools, contribute to
the professional dialogue as well. Individual law review articles serve the same purpose.
99. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 15, at xiii (noting the nonbinding character of New York bar
association ethics committees' opinions).
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bar associations impose jurisdictional limits on the questions that their
ethics committees may answer and that there are sometimes advantages
to seeking advice from an individual lawyer.'0° Professor Wolfram,
writing in 1986, suggested that the ethics committees were relegated to
insignificant questions, and cited a study that, as of 1968, approximately
half of the ABA opinions dealt with advertising and solicitation. °1
Professor Wolfram may have been right about ethics opinions circa
1968, or even about those circa 1986. If so, the critique no longer seems
to be a fair one. A review of recent ethics opinions will reveal many
dealing with fundamental questions. If lawyers do not bring them
important questions, many ethics committees can do what the ABA
committee does: fashion the questions themselves.'02 If the committees
develop a reputation for providing thoughtful advice, lawyers will bring
them questions that matter.
Consider the questions identified at the outset.03 None seem trivial.
Whether government lawyers should temper the zealousness of their
advocacy in order to serve the interest of justice goes to the heart of what
it means to be a government lawyer. Whether a union lawyer owes
duties to at union member raises a fundamental question about the union
lawyer's role. The question of a lawyer's relationship with an insurance
company is of intense concern for any lawyer retained by an insurance
company to represent a policyholder. Whether a lawyer may ask the
court to appoint a guardian without the client's consent is a recurring one
for elder law attorneys and others who represent incapacitated clients.
This is not to say that all ethics opinions are significant. Many still
address seemingly trivial questions about how lawyers may market their
services. For example, one recent New York State Bar Association
opinion answers the question, "[u]nder DR 2-102(B), may an attorney
use his or her surname together with the word 'group' as a law firm
name where the attorney's firm has a number of associates?"'0 4 Another
answers the question, "[m]ay a lawyer place an advertisement in the
Yellow Pages in which the lawyer uses the firm name 'A', or inserts the
letter 'A' before the firm name, in order to ensure favorable
placement?"'05 These questions may not seem particularly earthshaking,
100. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
101. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 2.6.6, at 65 & n.5.
102. The ABA Constitution grants the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility the power to express its opinion on a matter of legal ethics "on its own initiative."
ABA CONST. art. 31, § 31.7.
103. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
104. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 732 (2000).
105. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 740 (2001).
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in part because the relevant disciplinary rules themselves seem relatively
unimportant. Still, these questions are real. Answering them in a
published opinion gives the ethics committee a chance to remind
lawyers of restraints on how they may peddle their wares. But these
questions need not be the steady diet of ethics committees, if ever they
were.
VII. MUST ETHICS OPINIONS BE POORLY REASONED?
If Professors Finman and Schneyer were to examine the ABA
opinions issued in the decade of the 1990s, it is unlikely that they would
give them as harsh a grade as they gave the opinions from the 1970s. I
do not propose to do that work, however, much less the work of
examining hundreds of state and local ethics opinions. There is no doubt
that state and local ethics opinions vary in quality, as do judicial
decisions and most other legal writings that deal with legal ethics. Some
ethics committees make it their practice simply to give their conclusion
without providing any reasoning at all. It is easy to find opinions to
criticize even among those that are extensively reasoned and researched,
because issues of professional conduct are often hard and complex.
There is nothing inherent in the structure of ethics committees,
however, that would compel them to issue poorly reasoned or wrongly
decided opinions. Although some committees may be staffed by lawyers
who are unfamiliar with the body of literature on legal ethics, there is no
reason why they need to be. Virtually every state has legal ethics
professors and practitioners with expertise in this area who would be
willing to serve.' 6 Although some committees may not conduct research
or attempt to identify arguments on opposite sides of the questions
before them, nothing in the deliberative process requires them to ignore
relevant authorities and analyses.
The enterprise of publishing ethics opinions has certain
complexities that make criticism of ethics opinions almost inevitable,
but these do not reflect flaws in the committees' design. One complexity
is the collective nature of the process. There is a virtue in having
committee members with different perspectives attempt to forge a
consensus on tough questions of professional conduct. The resulting
106. For example, Professor Simon, who authored a treatise on the New York disciplinary
rules, has served on the New York State Bar Association's committee since 1995 and chaired the
Nassau County Bar Association's ethics committee; my colleague, Mary Daly, who also authored a
book on the New York Code, chaired the ethics committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York; Harvard law professor Andrew Kaufman, the author of a legal ethics case book, has
chaired the Massachusetts Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics since 1982.
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What then, should be the task of the ethics committee? Should the
committee try to predict what a court would say the rule meant if the
question ever came before the court? That is essentially what an
individual expert would do, but it is a very difficult task, especially with
regard to the type of questions that courts almost never address. Even if
it can be done, that approach is at odds with the idea that the legal
profession, through its bar associations, has an interest in moving
professional norms in the right direction. If part of the idea is to
influence professional understandings in the interstices, shouldn't the
ethics committee give its own view about what the preferable
interpretation of a disciplinary rule would be, as if the committee itself
were the court? In sum, part of why ethics opinions do not always
convincingly "interpret" the disciplinary rules is because ethics
committees face so many levels of ambiguity-ambiguity about what
the rules mean, about what principles of interpretation courts should
employ in interpreting them, and about whether ethics committees
should employ those same principles, assuming they can ascertain what
they are.
In the end, ethics committees should strive to render opinions that
are well-researched and well-reasoned, but I join Professor Underwood
in the view that the value of well-reasoned opinions may be overrated."0
Ethics committees have less need for exhaustive analysis precisely
because their opinions are not binding on courts and disciplinary
agencies. Rather than comparing ethics committees to courts, compare
them to the ALI, another collection of unpaid lawyers who offer their
collective view of what the law is and should be. In the end, the
members of the ALI simply issue black letter rules and comments,
without any indication by the group of how difficult the question was
and of why alternatives were rejected."' Even the most sparsely reasoned
ethics opinion gives as much explanation as the Restatement, and most
give far more.
At the same time, and paradoxically, the very fact that the opinions
are not definitive increases the incentive for ethics committees to issue
opinions that are well-reasoned and persuasive. The state supreme courts
have no reason to persuade; their word is law. Ethics committees are not
regulators or lawmakers. They are, at best, nothing more than a
collection of well-intentioned, reasonably knowledgeable lawyers who
volunteer their time. Since they do not exercise the state's regulatory
110. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 149.
111. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 23.
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opinion ordinarily has greater legitimacy than the opinion of any
particular member. However, when the committee issues a single
opinion embodying its collective view, the opinion is likely to seem
fuzzy, because it will paper over the different analyses by which
different members arrived at the same result. The problem will be
exacerbated when the committee issues a series of related opinions over
a period of time. As the composition of the committees change there
may be a shifting consensus of opinion which the committee must
balance against whatever loyalty it feels towards its prior jurisprudence.
It is much easier for an individual author-a treatise writer, for
example-to present a series of views that are coherent and sharply
drawn. The tendency to issue opinions that do little more than state a
conclusion is an understandable, although not ideal, way of dealing with
the difficulty of collective decision making. It might be preferable if
committees were more candid about how difficult and contentious
particular questions may be. But it is understandable, and perhaps
forgivable, that they are not. It is the tradition among courts as well as
ethics committees to understate the difficulty of the legal questions that
they are deciding, perhaps to avoid undermining the authority or
credibility of their decisions.
Another complexity is that there are no universally accepted
principles for interpreting disciplinary rules.07 The rules are not statutes
that, by common consensus, must be interpreted according to their
drafters' intention. '°3 Courts adopt the rules and have ultimate authority
to declare what the rules mean, regardless of what anyone may have
intended when they were written.' 9 Many courts treat the rules more like
statements of general principle than like statutes; they interpret the rules
in "common law" fashion, based on their contemporaneous judgment
about what standard of conduct is preferable in the situation before it.
Courts have vast discretion and can bring a wide range of considerations
to bear in deciding how to apply the rules. Deciding what a rule means
in an area of ambiguity typically calls for a policy judgment. Like rule
drafters, interpreters of ethics rules may take different views on
questions of policy. All of this explains, in part, why courts, as well as
ethics committees, sometimes interpret identically worded rules in
different ways.
107. See Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 485,486 (1989).
108. See id. at 487; cf Underwood, supra note 2, at 149 (observing that "[t]he ethics rules can
and should be applied as rules of reason").
109. See MARU, supra note 2, at 2.
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authority, their influence is likely to be proportional to the quality of
their opinions. They know that opinions that are poorly reasoned and
unpersuasive are more likely to provoke disagreement from practicing
lawyers and other entities and, ultimately, to be rejected or ignored.
VIII. ARE THE INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DEFICIENT?
Ethics committees have been around for decades.'12 No doubt, they
can improve how they do business, especially by taking advantage of
technological advancements. But, are they in need of a major overhaul?
Since I believe that bar association ethics committees can make
substantial contributions to the legal profession as presently organized,
my answer would be no. Further, I have doubts about whether
substantial changes would be an improvement.
One possibility is to assign all or part of the function of bar
association ethics committees to another entity in each state. For
example, courts might offer to issue advisory opinions upon application
from lawyers. Although judicial rulemaking may be a preferable process
for making decisions about the scope of lawyers' professional
obligations, because it provides greater opportunity for diverse views to
be considered,"3 judicial advisory opinions would in the very least be
definitive. The principal problem is that most courts do not have time to
take over the role of ethics experts and ethics committees." 4 No court has
enough time to issue definitive opinions on every question that a lawyer
may ask.
An alternative is to give the job to a judicial agency-either an
advisory committee appointed by the court or a disciplinary agency
under the court's aegis. Insofar as advisory opinions are issued by a
court-appointed committee of lawyers, rather than a bar association-
appointed committee of lawyers, it is hard to see why the opinions
would be of higher quality than those now issued by bar association
ethics committees. If advice on tough questions were given by full-time
staff members, the quality might be worse, since the conclusions would
not be the product of collective decision-making by lawyers with vastly
different perspectives. Even if their quality was low, advisory opinions
112. See Carro, supra note 2, at 9, 15 (stating that both the ABA and the New York County
Lawyers' Association established ethics committees in 1908 and that by 1980, eighty percent of
state and twenty-three percent of local ethics committees issued ethics opinions).
113. See Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct?, supra note 16, at 514-16.
114. See, e.g., Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease:
Designing the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (1997)
(discussing the "burgeoning federal docket").
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issued by a single state entity under the auspices of the state judiciary
could not easily be ignored.
It is far from clear, however, that making ethics opinions more
authoritative is necessarily a good thing. In the area of legal ethics, there
is a lot to be said for letting questions percolate for a while and inviting
many interested parties to weigh in. In other areas of the law, by the time
a tribunal issues a definitive opinion, a question may have been kicked
around for a while by lower courts, commentators, and others. Ethics
committees, in contrast, are often writing on a blank slate. Their
opinions are the first word. Should they also be the last word? It seems
better for opinions to be issued by bar associations, which have no legal
authority, and best to have opinions issued by different bar associations
within a state as well as nationally. When commentators or different
committees disagree with an ethics committee's opinion, that is all for
the good, because the differing expressions of view provide a clearer
picture of a question's difficulty to rule makers and courts who have the
ability definitively to resolve the question.
Proposals directed at preserving ethics committees but reforming
how they do their work may also be unnecessary, if not harmful. One
possibility is to remove limits on the questions of professional conduct
that the committees will answer. At present, many committees avoid
resolving legal questions other than those calling for interpreting the
applicable rules of professional conduct, because that is where the court
opinions provide the least guidance and where the committees have
developed expertise."5 They avoid deciding questions pending in
disciplinary proceedings and litigation, because they do not want to
appear to usurp the role of disciplinary agencies and courts." 6 They
avoid questions involving past conduct or the conduct of someone other
than the inquiring lawyer, because they are concerned about condemning
a lawyer based on a one-sided version of the facts." 7 Perhaps these
explanations are not compelling, and the committees are too
circumspect."8 But, if they have enough on their plate to keep them
busy, enough important questions remain for them to answer, and there
are other resources available to lawyers to deal with questions that the
committees cannot fully answer, there seems to be no compelling reason
to expand their range.
115. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 131.
116. See SIMON, supra note 15, at xiv; Underwood, supra note 2, at 143.
117. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 143.
118. For a more extensive defense of the committees' jurisdictional limits, see id. at 143-44.
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Another possibility is to change the committees' internal
deliberative processes, for example, by assigning lawyers to engage in
adversarial argument on each question, or by inviting comment in some
fashion from the practicing bar. These reforms would make the ethics
committees slower and less productive. Ethics committees are staffed by
unpaid lawyers seeking to engage in professional service." 9 Their time is
not endlessly elastic. The committees therefore need to strike a balance
between the amount of time and deliberation that goes into an individual
opinion and the number of opinions they issue. In the New York State
Bar Association, some have argued that there is already too much
collective deliberation, at least in the case of private letters that are sent
to a single lawyer and then never made the subject of a published
opinion. Making ethics committees more like courts or administrative
agencies would not necessarily lead to better opinions, but would
certainly reduce their number.
IX. CONCLUSION
It would be foolish to suggest that bar association ethics
committees are perfect. Certainly, they are not. But, it also seems
unfair to suggest that they are fundamentally flawed. In their present
form, they are capable of making a variety of important contributions,
and in many jurisdictions they do. They may need to be fine-tuned, but
they are not broken.
119. See SIMON, supra note 15, at xiv; McCaslin, supra note 2, at 971 (noting that "since the
positions are almost always voluntary, the choice is limited to those who want to participate")
(footnote omitted)).
120. See generally Carol M. Langford & David M. M. Bell, Finding a Voice: The Legal Ethics
Committee, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 855 (2002).
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